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Noecker: Personal Jurisdiction - Wyoming's New Long-Arm Statute - Olmstead
PERSONAL JURISDICTION-Wyoming's New Long-Arm Statute. Olmstead v.
American Granby Co., 565 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1977).

On May 13, 1977, the Wyoming Supreme Court handed
down Olmstead v. American Granby Co., 1 a personal injury
case which upheld the exercise of personal jurisidiction under
2
subsection (a)(iv) of Wyoming's former long-arm statute.
Two weeks later a new long-arm statute,8 which was enacted
by the 1977 Wyoming legislature, became effective. This case
note analyzes the facts of the Olmstead case under Wyoming's
new long-arm statute.
An air pressure tank exploded while the appellant, Roger
Olmstead, was adjusting it near Powell, Wyoming. Olmstead
brought a negligence and breach of warranty action against
appellees State Stove and Manufacturing Company, Inc.,
American Granby Company, Billings Pipe and Supply Company and six other defendants. The district court held that
under the previous long-arm statute, 4 the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the appellees.5
The air tank went through a four step distribution system
before reaching the Wyoming consumer. State Stove designed
and manufactured the air tank and their affiliate, American
Granby, supplied the tank to Billings Pipe and Pump Supply
Company. Billings Pipe, a wholesale-retail distributor of
plumbing equipment, in turn filled Sheridan retailer A. L.
Scott and Sons' unsolicited order for the tank. Scott sold the
tank to the ultimate Wyoming consumer. 6
Copyright©O 1978 by the University of Wyoming.

1. Olmstead v. American Granby Co., 565 P.2d 108 (Wyo. 1977).
2. WYO. STAT. § 5-4.2 (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1977) provided:
(a) In addition to all other bases of jurisdiction otherwise authorized or provided
by law, any court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's
(i) transacting any business in this state;
(ii) contracting to supply services or things in this state;
(iii) causing tortious injury-by an act or omission in this state;
(iv) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this
state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct in this state or derives substantial revenue from goods consumed
or services used in this state;
(v) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state; or
(vi) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting.
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim
for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him.
3. WYO. STAT. § 5-4.3 (Interim Supp. 1977), provides:
(a) A Wyoming court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with
the Wyoming or United States Constitutions.
4. WYO. STAT. § 54.2 (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1977).
5. Olmstead v. American Granby Co., supra note 1, at 109.
6. Id- at 110.
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The appellees were not incorporated in Wyoming, nor did
they maintain any offices, facilities, agents or employees in
Wyoming. State Stove's method of shipping its products to
Wyoming consumers through independent parties accounted
for less than 1/100 of 1% of its total revenue. American
Granby utilized eight Wyoming wholesalers generating revenues under $5,000.00 while Billings Pipe filled unsolicited Wyoming orders amounting to $8,423.80 in 1973 and
$13,366.48 in 1974. The Wyoming Supreme Court held
there was jurisidiction over the appellees under subsection
(1)(iv) of the repealed long-arm statute7 based on the rationale
that the appellees distribution system was a "persistent course
of business" and the appellees derived "substantial revenue
from goods consumed '" in Wyoming. 9
BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
United States Supreme Court
A thorough discussion of the history, growth and development of in personam jurisdiction is beyond the scope of
this case note; however, a brief identification of the jurisdictional problem and the test used to determine the reach of
long-arm jurisdiction is necessary. 10
The jurisdictional problem was set out in Pennoyer v.
Neff" when the Supreme Court held that a state only had in
personam jurisdiction over people who were served with process within the state's territory. Furthermore, a judgment by
a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties
was unenforceable in other states and void in the rendering
state because the judgment violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. The Court's holding in Pennoyer
was based upon the principles "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory"'' and that "no State can excercise direct
7. WYO. STAT. § 5-4.2 (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1977).
8. WYO. STAT. § 5-4.2 (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1977).
9. Ornstead v. American Granby Co., supra note 1, at 115.
10. For background discussions see WRIGHT & MILLER, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1064 (1969); Comment, Nonresident Jurisdiction in Wyoming: An
Analysis of Jurisdiction in Products Liability and Libel Litigation, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV. 557 (1976); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 138 (1968); Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d
532 (1969); Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 397 (1969).
11.

95 U.S. 714 (1877).

12.

Id. at 722.
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jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without

its territory."

13

Later Supreme Court decisions modified the territorial
limits of a state's jurisdictional power and thus expanded the
boundaries of a state court's personal jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v. Washington 4 was a landmark decision
which established the present "mimimum contacts" jurisdictional test. According to the Supreme Court, satisfaction of
due process depends upon "the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure."' 15 Under this minimum contacts test, a defendant's
continuous, systematic activities which directly give rise to
the cause of action will confer jurisdiction. On the other
hand, a defendant's single, isolated activity which is unconnected with the cause of action will be insufficient to confer
jurisdiction. 6 The majority of the jurisdiction cases are in between these two extremes. In this grey area "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum and the litigation" 1 7 determines whether or not it is just to exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant.
Subsequent to International Shoe, the Supreme Court
seemed tQ add one requirement which must be met before
the minimum contact test can be applied. Hansen v.Denckla' 8 indicated that there must be some contact whereby the
defendant invokes the benefits and protection of the state
laws by "purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the state." 19
The Wyoming Supreme Court
Until the Olmstead decision, there had been only two
Wyoming cases which dealt with the reach of Wyoming's
long-arm statutes. The first decision, Ford Motor Co. v.Arguello,20 involved a personal injury action brought against
Ford Motor Company. The court reasoned that Ford's con13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 318.

17. Shaffer v. Heitner, -U.S_.97 S.Ct. 2,569, 2580 (1,977L
18. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
19. Id. at 253.
20. 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963).
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tacts with Wyoming which included an occasional agent in
Wyoming, and a continuous method of doing business with
state-wide dealer relationships through which Ford obtained
financial benefits and received the protection of Wyoming
laws 21 were sufficient to establish the court's jurisdiction.
The issue as to the length of Wyoming's prior long-arm
statute was raised again in Cozzens v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
but this time the court refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over the several corporate defendants. 2 This case involved Wyoming residents who had purchased a plane from a
Montana corporation and who were killed when the aircraft
crashed in Colorado. The contacts with Wyoming included
several corporate defendants who distributed their products
through independent Wyoming dealers. Furthermore, all the
defendants had income from previous sales in Wyoming. However, the court held the defendants were immune from jurisdiction due to the facts that the cause of action did not arise
from the defendant's Wyoming activities, the defendants did
not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of doing
business in Wyoming, and the defendants maintained only
23
casual, isolated transactions of limited duration.
JURISDICTION UNDER THE NEW STATUTE

In 1977 the Wyoming legislature repealed Wyoming's detailed long-arm statute (Sections 5-4.1 and 5-4.2 of the Wyoming statutes).24 A simplified long-arm statute was enacted
when Section 5-4.3 was amended to read "(a) A Wyoming
Court may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent
with the Wyoming or the United States Constitution."2 5
Under the repealed long-arm statute, the issue of whether
or not the court had jurisdiction was a two-part question.
First, the court had to decide whether or not the defendant's
activities were sufficient to exercise jurisdiction under the
statute. If so, the court then had to decide whether or not
the state statute, as applied to the case, violated the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions.2 6 The enact21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 895.
514 P.2d 1375 (Wyo. 1973).
Id. at 1378.
WYo. STAT. § 5-4.2 (Supp. 1975) (repealed 1977).
WYO. STAT. § 5-4.3 (Interim Supp. 1977).
Olmstead v. American Granby Co., supra note 1, at 111.
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ment of the new 1977 long-arm statute now extends jurisdiction to its constitutional limits. In so doing, the legislature
has solved some of the problems that faced the old statute;
namely, the problem of where defendant's activities fell within due process and not within the statute and also the potential problem of activities which were within the statute
but outside due process. Thus, the personal jurisdiction issue
has been reduced to the single question of whether or not extending jurisdiction over the defendant violates the due process clause of the federal and state constitutions.
Although the Olmstead court purported to utilize the
two question analysis, 7 the court's opinion focused mainly
on the first question; to wit, why the defendants' activities
established jurisdiction under the repealed long-arm statute.
This case note will focus on the second question of why the
court's extension of jurisdiction did not violate due process
and thus will attempt to analyze why Olmstead would not be
unconstitutional under the new "due process" statute.
Since the Olmstead defendants did not maintain any
agents, employees or offices in Wyoming and did not solicit
or advertise in Wyoming, the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction seems to be based on the act of injecting the air
pressure tank into a nationwide distribution system.2 8 The
importance of Olmstead is therefore the due process considerations which support exercising jurisdiction over a manufacturer which markets its products in Wyoming through a
nationwide distribution system. The holding that due process
will allow jurisdiction in this situation is particularly important to Wyoming due to the fact that few products are manufactured here, and thus Wyoming consumers must depend
upon foreign manufacturer's for their products.2
DUE PROCESS FACTORS INVOLVED IN OLMSTEAD
There are several due process considerations a court will
review. Among the most prevalent are: a) foreseeability, including whether the cause of action arose directly from the
defendant's contacts, b) the purposefully availing act, c) the
27. Id.
28. Id. at 115.
29. Note, Nonresident Jurisdiction in Wyoming: An Analysis of Jurisdiction in Products Liability and Libel Litigation, 11 LAND & WATER L. REV. 557, 569 (1976).
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benefit and protection the defendant received from state laws
and d) forum considerations.
Foreseeability is the most important due process factor
courts have considered in determining whether the nature
and the quality of a defendant's activities satisfy due process.30 Courts have often indicated due process will probably
be satisfied if the defendants could reasonably foresee that
the state exercising jurisdiction could become a forum for litigation. 31 The reason is that if a defendant can forsee litigation in Wyoming, he can anticipate the burden of a suit and
can take precautionary measures to decrease the inconvenience of defending a suit away from home (such as treating
statistically predictable litigation expenses as a cost of doing
business).Y Furthermore, when a manufacturer can foresee
litigation, it cannot reasonably claim surprise when a state requires it to answer for the damage its product allegedly caused
within the state. 33
In Olmstead foreseeability weighs heavily towards exercising jurisdiction. American Granby's marketing system included eight local Wyoming wholesalers and other regional
wholesalers, such as Billings Pipe. The air tank came to Wyoming through this distribution system, thus Olmstead's cause
of action arose directly from the defendant's jurisdictional
acts. According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, this system
of distribution should give the defendants' knowledge that
their products "could reasonably be expected to reach Wyoming and be utilized here, especially when wholesalers4 in this
''
state or region are a part of the distribution process. 3
It is not clear from Olmstead whether the Wyoming Supreme Court would exercise jurisdiction where the defendant
could foresee litigation in Wyoming, but could not in connection with this particular product because the cause of action
did not arise from his Wyoming activities. An indirect cause
30.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974). The Utah Court held that
foreseeability as to whether the product would be sold in the state would point
towaxd jurisdiction, whereas foreseeability that the consumer would transport the
product into the state would not be sufficient to sustain jurisdiction.
Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1969).
Note, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Foreign CorporationsDealing Indirectly With
the State: Application of the Minimum Contacts Theory When Interpreting a LongArm Statute, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 649,661 (1974).
Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. 11. 1965).
Olmstead v. American Granby Co., supra note 1, at 115.
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of action could arise, for example, where the plaintiff could
prove that the defendant utilized a marketing system to ship
products into Wyoming, but he could not prove how the specific product which caused his injury came into Wyoming.
This situation is exemplified in the California case of Buckeye
Boiler Co. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County. There the plaintiff proved that the defendant shipped tanks
into California, but due to lack of information he was unable
to prove how the tank which caused his injury came into California. According to the court, plaintiff had established a
prima facie case for exercising jurisdiction when he showed
that the defendant used a distribution system to ship products
into California. The court then shifted the burden of avoiding
jurisdiction to the defendant, who was forced to prove that
the particular tank came to California in an unforeseeable
manner; in other words that placement in California was not
purposeful. Furthermore, the defendant had to show that defending a suit involving this particular boiler was substantially
different in nature and extent than defending actions involving boilers regularly shipped into California.3
Another due process requirement that has been suggested
by the United States Supreme Court is whether or not the defendant did some act whereby he "purposefully availed" himself of the right to do business in the forum stateY The significance of Olmstead is that a defendant may satisfy this
"purposefully availing" requirement indirectly. Placing products into the system of distribution is the purposefully availing act. 38 In this respect Olmstead seems to recognize the
commercial reality that a manufacturer is really doing business
with a state when wholesalers or retailers sell its products
within the state.
The foreseeability and the "purposefully availing" requirements in Olmstead were both satisfied by the act of placing
the air pressure tank into the distribution system. While State
Stove (the parent corporation of American Granby) manufactured the air tank, American Granby was the only defen35.
36.
37.
38.

71 Cal.2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.Rptr. 113 (1969).
!d. at 66.
Hansen v. Denckla. supra note 18.
Olmstead v. American Granby Co., supra note 1, at 115.
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dant who placed the product into the distribution process. 3
This fact raised the issue of whether or not American Granby's jurisdictional act can be imputed to its parent corporation State Stove.
The Wyoming Supreme Court imputed Granby's act to
State Stove without any discussion; moreover, the opinion
gives little information as to the specific nature of the relationship between American Granby and State Stove. Although
it is not clear what relationship is necessary, the decisions
from the Fifth Circuit may help define the parameters of what
facts are required to impute jurisdictional acts of the subsidiary to the parent corporation. The Fifth Circuit has held
that common stock ownership and common identity of officers alone were insufficient. 40 Jurisdiction can be established
by a showing of parental control over the subsidiary and that,
41
for operational purposes, they were really one corporation.
Control over the subsidiary can be shown by such facts as:
the two corporations shared offices, or salesmen; the parent
exercised control over the subsidiary through such means as
doing the subsidiary's planning, advertising, bookkeeping,
legal advice or controlling the subsidiary's salaries. 42 The
court's silence on this issue may be explained by the reasoning that State Stove's delivery of the tank to American Granby after State Stove manufactured the tank was really the
first step in the distribution process.
The benefit and protection the defendant receives from
state laws is another due process consideration. 43 Although
the court in Olmstead did not recognize this factor, other
courts have held this benefit can also be enjoyed indirectly.
In Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 44 the Fifth Circuit recognized that because manfacturers rarely deal directly with
consumers, the benefits which wholesalers receive from the
forum state are essential to the manufacturer's conduct of
business. Perhaps one indication of how much benefit a manufacturer received from Wyoming laws is the amount of rev39. Id. at 110.
40.

Turner v. Jack Tar Grand Bahama, Ltd., 353 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1965).

41. Id. at 956.
42.

Frazier, III v. Alabama Motor Club, Inc., 349 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1965); Reul v. Sa-

hara Hotel, 372 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
43. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 14, at 319.
44. 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970).
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enues the manufacturer or his wholesalers earned in Wyoming
from the sale of the manufacturer's product.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that certain
"forum considerations" are also a part of the due process jurisdictional analysis. 5 One forum factor is the availability of
witnesses and evidence. 46 If most of the witnesses and the
evidence are located in the forum state, then exercising jurisdiction is less likely to offend due process. 47 This factor
seems to recognize that due process is a question of fundamental fairness and, therefore, can be a question of balancing
inconveniences of both parties. In Olmstead, the explosion
occurred in Wyoming; therefore, evidence and witnesses regarding the explosion and the damages were probably located
in Wyoming. Furthermore, had the defendants in Olmstead
raised issues of contributory negligence or negligent maintenance of the tank, their own witnesses would also have been
in Wyoming." All these factors point toward exercising jurisdiction in Wyoming.
A second forum consideration is whether or not the
plaintiff has an alternative forum where all the defendants
could be sued together. 49 The availability of an alternative forum can be restricted by the residence of the defendants. In
Olmstead at least one of the defendants, A. L. Scott and Sons,
was a Wyoming resident. Assuming that the warranty allegation was not based upon a federal statute, there was probably
no alternative forum where Olmstead could litigate the entire
action in one suit. A federal district court would not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the case because there would
be no diversity jurisdiction, ° since plaintiff and one of the
defendants were Wyoming residents, and there would be no
federal question jurisdiction if the negligence action and the
breach of warranty action were both based upon state law
claims. If Olmstead attempted to sue State Stove and Am-rican Granby in their home state, that court would probably
not have long-arm jurisdiction over the Wyoming defendants.
If the court had not taken jurisdiction, Olmstead would have
45.

Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, supra note 20, at 895.

46. Id.
47.
48.

49.

50.

Buckeye Boiler Co. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 35.
Note, Nonresident Jurisdictionin Wyoming, supra note 29.

Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, supra note 20.

In this situation there would be no jurisdiction in federal court due to the complete

diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
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been forced to split his action into several law suits. This result is undesirable in light of the judicial policy of discouraging multiplicity of litigation 51 Also, separate law suits could
subject the plaintiff to conflicting results. As the California
Supreme Court pointed out, "the defendants' in each case
may be able to avoid liability for this condition by pointing
5 2
the finger at the absent defendant(s)."
CONCLUSION

Even though the Olmstead case was decided under Wyoming's repealed long-arm statutes, the decision extends the
boundaries of personal jurisdiction further than previous Wyoming cases. Under the new statute this extension does not
violate due process because the defendant's method of distributing its products through state and regional wholesalers
and retailers was a purposeful act which made Wyoming litigation foreseeable and allowed the defendants protection of
the Wyoming laws. The forum considerations of availability
of witnesses and evidence and the probable lack of an alternative forum also support the Court's decision to exercise jurisdiction.
Olmstead's cause of action arose directly from the defendant's distribution system. Wyoming could still expand personal jurisdiction where the cause of action arose indirectly
by shifting the burden of avoiding jurisdiction to the defendant as the California Supreme Court has done.5 3
REBECCA H. NOECKER

51.

WRIGHT & MILLER, 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1602, at 18 (1972).

52. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 35, at
67.
53. Id.
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